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76 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: A “GET OUT 
OF JAIL FREE” CARD FOR STATE 
PATENT OWNERS AT THE PTAB? 
ANTHONY J. ZUCCHERO & WARREN THOMAS* 
The America Invents Acts (“AIA”) introduced new post-grant 
proceedings, including the inter partes review (“IPR”), designed to stem the 
tide of rising patent litigation costs and address perceived deficiencies in 
patent quality.1 IPRs allow third parties to challenge the validity of claims in 
an issued patent in view of printed publications and patents.2 Importantly, 
the structure of IPRs—including limitations on motion and discovery 
practice as well as the statutory mandate that proceedings be conducted 
within 12-18 months—dictate that the proceedings are generally shorter and 
less expensive than district court proceedings.3 Further, many administrative 
patent judges (“APJs”) have technical backgrounds that equip them to 
address complicated arguments related to novelty and non-obviousness.4 
Given these advantages, IPRs have become a powerful tool, particularly for 
defendants in patent infringement suits.5 
Recently, patent owners have invoked state sovereign immunity as a 
defense to IPRs before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”). The 
 
 * Anthony J. (“A.J.”) Zucchero, Ph.D., is a student at Georgia State University College of Law 
and a patent agent at Meunier Carlin & Curfman LLC in Atlanta, Georgia. Warren Thomas is a principal 
at Meunier Carlin & Curfman specializing in inter partes review proceedings and related intellectual 
property litigation. 
 1. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 40 (2011) (stating that Congress crafted the AIA post-
grant proceedings to “establish a more efficient and streamlined patent system that will improve patent 
quality and limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs”). 
 2. Id. at 12. 
 3. Id.  
 4. Matias Ferrario, Jennifer Giordano-Coltart & Leslie Grab, The Use of Inter Partes Review 
Petitions in ANDA Litigation, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Aug. 4, 2014), 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/intellectual/articles/summer2014-0814-use-inter-
partes-review-petitions-anda-litigation.html.  
 5. Matthew Rizzolo, Samuel Brenner, Andrew Sutton & Michael Gershoni, Shielded by 
Sovereignty: The Implications for Patentees of Covidien v. University of Florida Research Foundation & 
Its Progeny, 45 AIPLA Q.J. 593, 600 (2017). 
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PTAB has generally been receptive to states invoking sovereign immunity 
to avoid IPRs. However, availability of this defense at the PTAB raises 
public policy concerns, particularly in view of recent efforts by private 
companies to enter into agreements with Native American tribes to shield 
patents from challenge at the PTAB using the related doctrine of tribal 
sovereign immunity. With the Federal Circuit poised to address the issue of 
state sovereign immunity defenses at the PTAB for the first time, the 
availability of this defense going forward is uncertain. Accordingly, 
practitioners need to be aware of the existing sovereign immunity landscape 
and understand how decisions at the appellate level may affect practice 
before the PTAB. 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
Sovereign immunity is a longstanding doctrine under common law that 
bars suits against sovereign entities without consent. 6  This principle is 
referenced explicitly in the Eleventh Amendment of the United States 
Constitution,7 although courts have noted that a state’s sovereign immunity 
“neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh 
Amendment.”8 Rather, the states’ immunity is a “fundamental aspect” of the 
sovereignty they enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution. 9  As 
such, a state is generally immune from suit unless (1) the state has waived 
its immunity10 or (2) Congress has properly abrogated the state’s immunity.11 
 
 6. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712–13 (1999). 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens 
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”).  
 8. Alden, 527 U.S. at 713.  
 9. Id. 
 10. See, e.g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447–48 (1883) (“The immunity from suit belonging 
to a state, which is respected and protected by the constitution within the limits of the judicial power of 
the United States, is a personal privilege which it may waive at pleasure; so that in a suit, otherwise well 
brought, in which a state had sufficient interest to entitle it to become a party defendant, its appearance 
in a court of the United States would be a voluntary submission to its jurisdiction, while, of course, those 
courts are always open to it as a suitor in controversies between it and citizens of other states.”).  
 11. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (“Congress may, in determining what 
is ‘appropriate legislation’ for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
provide for private suits against States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other 
contexts.”). 
 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (DO NOT DELETE) 5/21/2019  7:00 PM 
78 CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELL. PROP.| PTAB BAR ASSOCIATION Vol 18:4 
Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority 
Drawing on the broad principles of sovereign immunity reflected in the 
Eleventh Amendment, courts have extended the doctrine to many classes of 
disputes not enumerated in the Eleventh Amendment. 12  Recently, the 
Supreme Court extended sovereign immunity beyond courts to a proceeding 
before a federal administrative agency.13 In Federal Maritime Commission 
v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, South Carolina Maritime Services 
(“SCMS”), a private cruise ship company) filed a complaint with the Federal 
Maritime Commission (“FMC”) against the South Carolina State Ports 
Authority (“SCSPA”), alleging that the SCSPA’s refusal to provide berthing 
space for its ship violated the Shipping Act of 1984.14 
SCMS’s complaint was referred to an Administrative Law Judge 
(“ALJ”) at the FMC to assess whether the SCSPA’s actions violated the 
Shipping Act.15 In response, the SCSPA filed a motion to dismiss, asserting 
that they are an arm of the State of South Carolina and therefore immune 
from proceedings before the ALJ.16 The ALJ agreed with the SCSPA and 
dismissed SCMS’s complaint.17 However, the FMC, sua sponte, elected to 
review the ALJ’s ruling and reversed the ALJ.18 
The SCSPA appealed the Commission’s ruling to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. After reviewing the structure of proceedings 
before the ALJ, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the FMC proceeding 
“walks, talks, and squawks very much like a lawsuit” and therefore “is truly 
an adjudication.”19 Consequently, the court dismissed SCMS’s complaint, 
 
 12. Jason Kornmehl, Ericsson, Inc. v. Regents of the University of Minnesota and a New Frontier 
for the Waiver by Litigation Conduct Doctrine, 2018 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 7 (2018) (explaining that sovereign 
immunity has been extended to protect states from suits brought by classes of plaintiffs not enumerated 
in the Eleventh Amendment (e.g., the foreign nations, native American tribes, and the state’s own 
citizens) as well as suits in admiralty (as opposed to suits in “law and equity”) and to claims in state 
courts).  
 13. Rizzolo et al., supra note 5, at 607. 
 14. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 747–48 (2002).   
 15. Id. at 749. 
16.   Id.  
 17. Id. at 749–50 (“If federal courts that are established under Article III of the Constitution must 
respect States’ 11th Amendment immunity and Congress is powerless to override the States’ immunity 
under Article I of the Constitution, it is irrational to argue that an agency like the [Federal Maritime] 
Commission, created under an Article I statute, is free to disregard the 11th Amendment or its related 
doctrine of State immunity from private suits.”). 
 18. Id. at 750 (recounting the FMC’s holding that “state sovereign immunity . . . is meant to cover 
proceedings before judicial tribunals, whether Federal or state, not executive branch administrative 
agencies like the Commission.” (omission in original)).  
 19. S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 243 F.3d 165, 174 (4th Cir. 2001), aff’d, 535 U.S. 
743 (2002). 
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reasoning that sovereign immunity prevents a state from being compelled to 
participate in such an adjudicatory proceeding.20 
The Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s 
decision. To reach its decision, the Court grounded its analysis in the so-
called “Hans presumption” 21  and evaluated the structure of proceedings 
before the FMC to “determine whether they are the type of proceedings from 
which the Framers would have thought the States possessed immunity when 
they agreed to enter the Union.” 22  The Court identified a number of 
similarities between Article III proceedings and proceedings before the 
FMC.23 Given these “overwhelming” similarities, the Supreme Court held 
that “state sovereign immunity bars the FMC from adjudicating complaints 
filed by a private party against a nonconsenting State.”24 
Vas-Cath v. Curators of University of Missouri 
Courts have subsequently applied the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Federal Maritime Commission to proceedings before other administrative 
agencies, including the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(“USPTO”). For example, in Vas-Cath v. Curators of University of Missouri, 
the Federal Circuit’s reasoning suggested that interference proceedings at the 
USPTO are adjudicatory proceedings in which a state may assert sovereign 
immunity.25 
Vas-Cath stemmed from an interference between Vas-Cath and the 
Curators of University of Missouri (“Mizzou”). In this case, the USPTO 
granted a patent to Vas-Cath while Mizzou’s earlier filed application directed 
to similar technology was undergoing examination.26 Mizzou amended its 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 755 (stating that the “Hans presumption” means that “the 
Constitution was not intended to ‘rais[e] up’ any proceedings against the States that were ‘anomalous and 
unheard of when the Constitution was adopted’” (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18 (1890))). 
 22. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 756. 
 23. Id. at 756–59. Similarities noted by the Court included (1) Article III judges and ALJs both 
possess absolute immunity from suits; (2) Article III judges and ALJs perform similar duties within the 
context of the proceedings before them; (3) Article III judges and ALJs both function as “trier[s] of fact 
insulated from political influence;” (4) adjudicative proceedings before the FMC employ similar rules 
governing pleadings to those found in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and (5) Article III 
proceedings and proceeding before the FMC employ similar discovery and evidentiary rules. Id. 
 24. Id. at 760. 
 25. Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 473 F.3d 1376, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
 26. Id. at 1379. 
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application to provoke an interference, and the USPTO ultimately awarded 
the disputed claims to Mizzou.27 
Vas-Cath appealed the USPTO’s decision to the district court,28 and 
Mizzou then moved to dismiss arguing Eleventh Amendment immunity.29 
The district court agreed with Mizzou and dismissed Vas-Cath’s appeal. 
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the court analogized the case to 
Federal Maritime Commission and found that “contested interference 
proceedings in the PTO bear ‘strong similarities’ to civil litigation” such that 
“the administrative proceeding can indeed be characterized as a lawsuit.”30 
The Federal Circuit next noted that “a state’s voluntary entry into federal 
court serves to waive state immunity from federal adjudication of that 
claim.”31 Since Mizzou had “invoked and participated in [the] proceedings 
with no claim of immunity,” Mizzou thus waived any potential immunity as 
to the interference (including subsequent review in federal court).32 Implicit 
in this rationale is the Federal Circuit’s determination that an arm of the state, 
such as Mizzou, could also assert sovereign immunity as a defense to an 
interference at the USPTO. 
STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY BEFORE THE PTAB 
Recently, patent owners have asserted sovereign immunity as a defense 
to IPR proceedings before the PTAB. As detailed below, the PTAB has been 
willing to extend sovereign immunity to state patent owners in at least some 
circumstances. 
Covidien LP v. University of Florida Research Foundation, Inc. 
Sovereign immunity was first raised before the PTAB in Covidien LP 
v. University of Florida Research Foundation, Inc.33 The underlying dispute 
relates to a license agreement between Covidien and the University of 
Florida Research Foundation (“UFRF”) for rights under U.S. Patent No. 
 
 27. Id. at 1379–80. 
 28. See 35 U.S.C. § 146. 
 29. Vas-Cath, 473 F.3d at 1379–80. 
 30. Id. at 1382. 
 31. Id. at 1383. 
 32. Id. at 1382, 1385. 
 33. Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Res. Found., Inc., No. IPR2016-01274, -01275, and -01276 
(P.T.A.B. filed June 28, 2016).  
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7,062,251 (“the ‘251 patent”).34 After a dispute regarding the payment of 
royalties, UFRF sued Covidien for breach of contract in Florida state court 
seeking specific performance of an audit provision in the license 
agreement.35 Covidien counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that it did 
not infringe the ‘251 patent and removed the suit to the United State District 
Court for the Northern District of Florida.36 Subsequently, the district court 
found that UFRF was entitled to sovereign immunity with respect to the 
counterclaim and remanded the suit back to state court for consideration of 
UFRF’s contract claim.37 
Covidien filed three petitions seeking IPR of the ‘251 patent. UFRF 
responded by filing a motion to dismiss the IPRs on the grounds of sovereign 
immunity. In its motion, UFRF cited Federal Maritime Commission and 
argued that IPR proceedings are adjudicatory proceedings similar in 
structure to Article III court proceedings.38 Further, UFRF argued that it had 
not waived sovereign immunity because Covidien initiated all proceedings 
related to the ‘251 patent, both in federal district court and before the 
PTAB.39 
In response, Covidien argued that sovereign immunity does nor bar IPR 
proceedings.40 First, Covidien argued that patents are “a public right subject 
to any and all statutory conditions,” including post-grant proceedings such 
as IPRs.41 As such, Covidien argued that a post-grant proceeding can be 
conducted against any patent, regardless of the identity of the patent owner. 
Next, Covidien argued that sovereign immunity only applies to “suits 
or adjudications ‘commenced or prosecuted against’ [a] state.”42 Conversely, 
Covidien contended that IPRs are in rem proceedings directed against a 
patent itself.43 To support this position, Covidien cited the language of 35 
 
 34. Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Res. Found., Inc., No. IPR2016-01274, Paper 12 at 1. (P.T.A.B. 
Sept. 14, 2016). 
 35. Id.  
 36. Univ. of Fla. Res. Found., Inc. v. Medtronic PLC, No. 1:16CV183-MW/GRJ, 2016 WL 
3869877 (N.D. Fla. July 15, 2016) (granting plaintiff’s motion to remand after removal). 
 37. Univ. of Fla., 2016 WL 3869877, at *6. 
 38. Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Res. Found., Inc., IPR2016-01274, Paper 12 at 4–11 (P.T.A.B. 
Sept. 14, 2016). 
 39. Id. at 18–20 (arguing that the Florida state court breach of contract action did not implicate 
waiver before any federal tribunal). 
 40. Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Res. Found., Inc., IPR2016-01274, Paper 15 at 2 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 
28, 2016). 
 41. Id. at 3. 
 42. Id. at 5 (emphasis omitted). 
 43. Id. 
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U.S.C. § 311, which refers to an IPR as a review of “a patent” rather than a 
proceeding against a patent owner.44 Covidien disputed the characterization 
of an IPR as a dispute between parties based on the USPTO’s ability to 
continue an IPR without any third-party petitioner.45 Thus, because an IPR 
is not a suit “commenced or prosecuted against” a patent owner by a 
petitioner, Covidien contended that sovereign immunity could not apply. 
Third, Covidien argued that significant differences between IPR 
proceedings and Article III judicial proceedings render sovereign immunity 
inapplicable.46 Covidien noted that in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. 
Lee, 47  the Supreme Court determined that IPRs are “not quasi-judicial 
proceedings” but instead “specialized agency proceedings” that differ from 
Article III civil suits.48 Covidien then cited numerous differences between 
IPR proceedings and Article III suits to argue that these differences should 
be sufficient to distinguish from the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Federal 
Maritime Commission .49 
Finally, Covidien argued that sovereign immunity should not be 
available before the PTAB for public policy reasons. It contended that 
shielding patents from post-grant proceedings would erode patent quality by 
preserving patents “that should not have issued in the first place.”50 Further, 
Covidien argued that permitting sovereign immunity could undermine a 
stated goal of IPRs: to curb the activity of non-practicing entities (“NPEs”). 
If sovereign immunity is an available defense in AIA post-grant proceedings, 
Covidien argued, then NPEs could enter into arrangements with state 
universities to shield their patents from challenge. This would leave parties 
targeted by NPEs in the same position they were in before passage of the 
AIA. 
In January 2017, the PTAB granted UFRF’s motion to dismiss. 
Grounding its analysis in Federal Maritime Commission, the PTAB 
reviewed the structure of IPRs in detail and noted numerous similarities 
 
 44. Id. at 6. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 10–11. 
 47. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016). 
 48. Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Res. Found., Inc., No. IPR2016-01274, Paper 15 at 11 (P.T.A.B. 
Sept. 28, 2016).  
 49. Id. at 11–15. Differences cited by Covidien included (1) available remedies; (2) requirements 
regarding personal jurisdiction; (3) requirements regarding standing; (4) the ability to amend patent 
claims during the proceeding; (5) the breadth of discovery; and (6) applicable standards of proof. Id. 
 50. Id. at 16. 
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between IPR proceedings and Article III judicial proceedings.51 The PTAB 
explained that while some differences do exist, these differences are 
generally a matter of degree and reflect Congress’s desire to “establish a 
more efficient and streamlined patent system that will improve patent quality 
and limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs.”52 Therefore, 
the PTAB concluded that IPRs are sufficiently similar to Article III 
proceedings to implicate sovereign immunity.53 
The PTAB also rejected the additional arguments raised by Covidien. 
Regarding Covidien’s argument that a patent is a public right taken subject 
to statutory conditions, the PTAB concluded that there is no public rights 
exception to a state’s immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 54  The 
PTAB also dismissed Covidien’s argument that IPRs are in rem proceedings. 
At the outset, the PTAB noted that the very name of the proceeding (i.e., an 
inter partes review) implicates a proceeding between two parties over which 
the PTAB has jurisdiction.55 Likewise, other aspects of the IPR proceedings, 
such as the requirements for service of process and estoppel provisions 
designed to prevent patent owners from successive attacks, support the 
notion that an IPR is fundamentally an adjudication between two parties.56 
Finally, as to Covidien’s public policy concerns, the PTAB conceded 
that sovereign immunity could be used to shield patents from post-grant 
challenges. 57  But it reasoned that any such conflict with the statutory 
purposes of the AIA might be remedied by Congress itself, which may act to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity.58 The PTAB found nothing in the AIA, 
however, to suggest Congress had already done so. The PTAB also found no 
 
 51. Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Res. Found., Inc., No. IPR2016-01274, Paper 21 at 17–24 
(P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017). The PTAB noted the (1) similar roles of district court judges and PTAB judges 
during proceedings; (2) similar rules and procedures governing IPR proceedings and Article III judicial 
proceedings; (3) the availability of at least some discovery; and (4) the availability and nature of 
protective orders. Id. 
 52. Id. at 20 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 39 (2011)).  
 53. Id. at 25 (“On the whole, considering the nature of inter partes review and civil litigation, we 
conclude that the considerable resemblance between the two is sufficient to implicate the immunity 
afforded to the States by the Eleventh Amendment. Although there are distinctions, such as in the scope 
of discovery, we observe that there is no requirement that the two types of proceedings be identical for 
sovereign immunity to apply to an administrative proceeding. Further, we note that there are several 
similarities between civil litigation and inter partes review that are not unlike those compared in Vas-
Cath for interferences.”). 
 54. Id. at 11 (noting, among other things, that Covidien failed to cite any authority to support the 
proposition that a state’s immunity may be abrogated by a public rights exception).  
 55. Id. at 13. 
 56. Id. at 13–15. 
 57. Id. at 26. 
 58. Id. (citing Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996)). 
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indication that NPEs (or others) would exploit sovereign immunity to harm 
the patent system, much less that such activity would rise to a level to warrant 
stripping states of their sovereign immunity.59 
Upon entry of the PTAB’s order, Covidien’s three IPRs were dismissed. 
Further, as 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) states that a decision to institute (or not 
institute) an IPR is “final and nonappealable,” Covidien was (at least at first 
glance) unable to appeal the PTAB’s decision.60 While the PTAB’s decision 
in Covidien was not designated as precedential and therefore is non-binding 
on other panels, the PTAB has adopted the rationale from Covidien in all 
subsequent cases related to state sovereign immunity. 
NeoChord, Inc. v. University of Maryland, Baltimore 
In the wake of the PTAB’s decision in Covidien, University of 
Maryland, Baltimore (“UMB”) sought to dismiss a pending IPR filed by 
NeoChord, Inc. on the grounds of sovereign immunity.61 This case presented 
two additional issues for the PTAB to consider relative to Covidien: 
(1) whether UMB’s license of the patent at issue to a non-state entity affected 
UMB’s claim of sovereign immunity; and (2) whether UMB’s voluntary 
participation in the IPR waived sovereign immunity. 
With respect to the first issue, UMB conceded that the challenged patent 
was exclusively licensed to a non-state entity (Harpoon Medical, Inc.).62 
However, UMB argued that it retained substantial rights to the patent under 
 
 59. Id. at 27. 
 60. In Cuozzo, the Supreme Court addressed 35 U.S.C. § 314(d). In doing so, the Court noted that 
there is a strong presumption in favor of appellate review. Thus, while the Court in Cuozzo held that 
decisions regarding institution are generally not reviewable, the Court noted that circumstances might 
arise where an institution decision could be reviewed by an appellate court, such as where the decision 
implicates a Constitutional issue. See CuozzoSpeed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2141 (2016). 
Therefore, while the plain language of 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) would suggest that Covidien could not have 
appealed the PTAB’s decision to dismiss Covidien’s IPRs, Covidien arguably could have appealed the 
PTAB’s decision to the Federal Circuit without running afoul of the Supreme Court’s precedent in 
Cuozzo. 
 61. NeoChord, Inc. v. Univ. of Md., Baltimore, No. IPR2016-00208, Paper 24 at 1–2 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 
23, 2017).  
 62. Id. at 4. 
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the license agreement.63 Further, UMB noted that its license agreement with 
Harpoon expressly reserves UMB’s right to assert sovereign immunity.64 
However, NeoChord argued that UMB expressly waived sovereign 
immunity with respect to USPTO proceedings in its license agreement by 
agreeing to use USPTO reexamination and reissue proceedings to resolve 
any “Patent Challenge”—disputes regarding the validity and enforceability 
of the patent at issue—first, before initiating any other type of proceeding 
(e.g., a declaratory judgment action).65 NeoChord argued that this language 
consented to jurisdiction at the USPTO and that in analogous circumstances 
where a license agreement includes an agreement to federal district court 
jurisdiction, courts have considered this a waiver of sovereign immunity.66 
NeoChord also argued that UMB waived sovereign immunity through 
its voluntary participation in the IPR for more than one year.67 Specifically, 
NeoChord argued that courts had rejected belated claims of sovereign 
immunity68 and that UMB had failed to meet its burden to establish “why its 
belated attempt to raise [sovereign immunity] and introduce evidence that 
could have been introduced earlier should be excused.”69 NeoChord also 
noted that during its participation in the IPR, UMB repeatedly requested that 
the PTAB exercise authority of the IPR proceeding.70 
In May 2017, the PTAB granted UMB’s motion to dismiss on the 
grounds of sovereign immunity.71 The panel undertook its own analysis of 
 
 63. Id. at 5–6. Rights retained by UMB under the license agreement include (1) the right to practice 
the ‘386 patent; (2) the right to license the ‘386 patent to government agencies, universities, educational 
institutions, and non-profits for non-commercial purposes; (3) the right to publish scientific findings 
related to the ‘386 patent; (4) the right to pass-through royalties on sub-licenses granted by Harpoon 
Medical; (5) the right to share in any recovery in an action for infringement of the’386 patent; (6) the 
right to pre-approve any settlement or action that materially limits the scope, validity, or enforceability 
of the ‘386 patent; (7) the right to enforce the ‘386 patent should Harpoon Medical decline to do so; and 
(8) the right to respond to legal actions related to the’386 patent should Harpoon fail to respond. Id. 
 64. Id. at 6. Section 14.6 of UMB’s license agreement with Harpoon Medical states: “[n]o provision 
of this Agreement shall constitute or be construed as a limitation, abrogation, or waiver of any defense or 
limitation of liability available to the State of Maryland or its units . . . including without limitation the 
defense of sovereign immunity or any other governmental immunity.” Id. 
 65. NeoChord, Inc. v. Univ. of Md., Baltimore, No. IPR2016-00208, Paper 25 at 6 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 
2, 2017) (referencing Section 3.7 of the license agreement). 
 66. Id. at 17. 
 67. Id. at 1.  
 68. See, e.g., Hill v. Blind Ind. & Servs. of Md., 179 F.3d. 754, 757–58 (9th Cir. 1999).  
 69. NeoChord, Inc. v. Univ. of Md., Baltimore, No. IPR2016-00208, Paper 25 at 4–5 (P.T.A.B. 
Mar. 2, 2017).  
 70. Id. at 5 (citing the patent owner’s “request[]that the Board issue a Final Decision confirming the 
patentability of challenged claims 1-23 of the ‘386 patent.”). 
 71. NeoChord, Inc. v. Univ. of Md., Baltimore, No. IPR2016-00208, Paper 28 at 2 (P.T.A.B. May 
23, 2017).  
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applicable caselaw, including Federal Maritime Commission and Vas-Cath, 
and again concluded that sovereign immunity is available as a defense to IPR 
proceedings.72 
Next, the PTAB disagreed that UMB waived its immunity through 
participation in the IPR. It found that no time limit exists for asserting 
sovereign immunity,73 and it noted that courts have held that participation in 
a judicial proceeding does not constitute waiver absent a state’s affirmative 
action to invoke the court’s jurisdiction.74 
The PTAB also found that UMB’s license agreement did not waive or 
otherwise vitiate its sovereign immunity defense. Specifically, the PTAB 
held that the license only operates as a waiver with respect to Harpoon.75 
Further, the PTAB found that UMB retained significant rights under the 
license with Harpoon so that UMB was an indispensable party. Thus, the IPR 
could not proceed without UMB’s participation and must be terminated.76 
While again not designated precedential, the NeoChord decision 
reinforced the PTAB’s reasoning in Covidien and effectively extended 
sovereign immunity to non-state licensees of state-owned patents, provided 
that the state retains at least some rights under the license agreement. 
Reactive Surfaces Ltd., LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp. 
The PTAB next addressed sovereign immunity in Reactive Surfaces 
Ltd., LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp.77 The underlying dispute relates to an IPR 
filed by Reactive Surfaces Ltd. requesting review of a patent that is co-
owned by Toyota and the Regents of the University of Minnesota 
(“Minnesota”).78 Toyota and Minnesota filed a joint motion to dismiss that 
reiterated the PTAB’s rationale from Covidien.79 Toyota and Minnesota then 
addressed whether the proceeding could continue without Minnesota’s 
participation. 
 
 72. Id. at 4–7. 
 73. Id. at 14 (citing Fla. Dep’t of St. v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 683 (1982)). 
 74. Id. at 14–15. 
 75. Id. at 17–18. 
 76. Id. at 19. 
 77. Reactive Surfaces Ltd., LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp, No. IPR2016-01914, Paper 36 (P.T.A.B. 
July 13, 2017). 
 78. Id. at 2.  
 79. Reactive Surfaces Ltd., LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp, No. IPR2016-01914, Paper 23 at 2–11 
(P.T.A.B. Mar. 3, 2017). 
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Toyota and Minnesota stated that if Minnesota solely owned the patent, 
it would be undisputed that the IPR should be dismissed.80  Toyota and 
Minnesota argued that the situation should be no different in the case of a 
co-owned patent because “[a]djudicating the merits of [the IPR] in 
[Minnesota’s] absence would violate the State of Minnesota’s immunity no 
less than requiring the University to become a party would.”81 
However, Reactive Surfaces argued that in all cases where federal 
courts have dismissed an action against a non-state patent owner based on 
the sovereign immunity of a state co-owner, this dismissal was based on 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b). 82  Reactive Surfaces argued that 
absent Rule 19(b)—which does not have a counterpart in the AIA trial 
rules—there is simply no mechanism to dismiss the IPR.83 
Applying the rationale set forth in Covidien and NeoChord, the PTAB 
held that Minnesota possessed sovereign immunity and dismissed Minnesota 
from the IPR proceeding.84 As the PTAB reasoned, co-owners Toyota and 
Minnesota share an identical interest in the patent such that Toyota can 
adequately represent Minnesota’s interests. Thus, the PTAB concluded that 
the IPR could still proceed without Minnesota’s participation.85 
Ericsson v. Regents of University of Minnesota 
Ericsson represents the latest proceeding to implicate state sovereign 
immunity before the PTAB. The underlying dispute began when Minnesota 
sued several telecommunications providers who allegedly purchased 
infringing network components from Ericsson.86 Ericsson intervened in the 
 
 80. Id. at 11. Reactive Surfaces, like Covidien and NeoChord, argued that IPRs are not suits against 
a state (but rather are in rem proceedings) and that IPR proceedings are dissimilar enough from civil suits 
such that sovereign immunity should not apply. Reactive Surfaces Ltd., LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 
IPR2016-01914, Paper 25 at 8–17 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 17, 2017). However, this argument was found 
unpersuasive by the PTAB. Reactive Surfaces Ltd., LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp, No. IPR2016-01914, 
Paper 36 at 4 (P.T.A.B. July 13, 2017).  
 81. Reactive Surfaces Ltd., LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. IPR2016-01914, Paper 23 at 11 
(P.T.A.B. Mar. 3, 2017). 
 82. Reactive Surfaces Ltd., LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. IPR2016-01914, Paper 25 at 19 
(P.T.A.B. Mar. 17, 2017). 
 83. Id. at 19–20. 
 84. Reactive Surfaces Ltd., LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. IPR2016-01914, Paper 36 at 11 
(P.T.A.B. July 13, 2017). 
 85. Id. at 15–17. 
 86. Kornmehl, supra note 12, at 10.  
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suit and thereafter filed a series of petitions requesting IPR of Minnesota’s 
patents.87 
Ericsson proactively raised the issue of sovereign immunity in its 
petitions and argued that Minnesota waived any sovereign immunity it might 
possess by asserting the patents in district court.88 Specifically, Ericsson 
compared IPRs to a federal court’s compulsory counterclaim and argued that 
Minnesota had effectively “consented to jurisdiction in the PTAB” where it 
“could ‘surely anticipate’ . . . invalidity claims before the PTAB.”89 
As expected, Minnesota filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of 
sovereign immunity. Minnesota argued that a waiver of sovereign immunity 
resulting from an infringement suit extends only to compulsory 
counterclaims in the same action and forum.90 Further, Minnesota argued 
that Ericsson’s contention that filing suit in one forum should constitute 
waiver in a separate forum is contrary to established precedent.91 Finally, 
Minnesota attacked Ericsson’s effort to analogize the IPRs to counterclaims, 
noting that counterclaims by definition must be presented in district court 
pleadings and must be able to be resolved within the same suit as the original 
claim.92 
The PTAB denied Minnesota’s motion to dismiss. In its decision, the 
PTAB adopted the rationale of the Covidien panel, but it held that Minnesota 
waived its immunity by filing suit for patent infringement in district court.93 
The PTAB acknowledged that a waiver of sovereign immunity does not 
necessarily extend to a separate action, but the PTAB argued that no “bright-
line rule” prohibits such a waiver from applying. 94  Rather, the PTAB 
explained that the extent of a state’s waiver is a judgment based on the desire 
to avoid “unfairness and inconsistency.”95 Because a suit in federal court 
triggers the one-year bar for a defendant to petition for IPR, the PTAB 
 
 87. Ericsson, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., No. IPR2017-01186, -01197, -01200, -01213, -
01214, and -01219 (P.T.A.B. filed Mar. 28, 2017). 
 88. Kornmehl, supra note 12, at 10. 
 89. Rizzolo, supra note 5, at 630. 
 90. Ericsson, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., No. IPR2017-01186, Paper 8 at 12 (P.T.A.B. June 
21, 2017) (citing Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Knight, 321 F.3d 1111, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).  
 91. Id. (citing Tegic Commc’ns Corp. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Tex. Sys., 458 F.3d 1335 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006), in which the Federal Circuit held that Texas’s filing of an infringement suit in Texas did not 
waive sovereign immunity with respect to a defendant’s supplier’s declaratory judgment action for 
invalidity in Washington). 
 92. Id. at 15. 
 93. Ericsson, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., No. IPR2017-01186, Paper 14 at 4 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 
19, 2017). 
 94. Id. at 7. 
 95. Id. 
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reasoned that a patent owner would reasonably expect the defendant to file 
an IPR petition in response to such a suit.96 The PTAB concluded that “[i]t 
would be unfair and inconsistent to allow a State to avail itself of the federal 
government’s authority by filing a patent infringement action in federal 
court, but then selectively invoke its sovereign immunity to ensure that a 
defendant is barred from requesting an inter partes review of the asserted 
patent from a different branch of that same federal government.”97 
On this basis, the PTAB denied Minnesota’s motion to dismiss on the 
grounds of sovereign immunity. Minnesota has appealed the PTAB’s 
decision to the Federal Circuit, and oral arguments were held on March 19, 
2019.98 Therefore, the Federal Circuit will soon have its first opportunity to 
directly address state sovereign immunity before the PTAB. 
LANDSCAPE AT THE PTAB IN THE WAKE OF THESE CASES 
Absent a decision from either the Federal Circuit or Supreme Court, 
state patent owners will likely continue to enjoy sovereign immunity from 
post-grant proceedings in the wake of the PTAB’s decisions discussed 
above, provided that (1) the patent at issue is not co-owned by a non-state 
entity and (2) the state has not previously asserted the patent at issue against 
the petitioner in district court. 
Since the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980,99 universities have 
increasingly amassed large patent portfolios.100 Many of these universities 
(as well as their associated research foundations) are public universities that 
qualify as arms of their respective state governments.101 As such, these state 
universities’ patent portfolios enjoy immunity from challenges before the 
PTAB and before district courts in declaratory judgment actions. 102 
Consequently, third parties—including licensees, potential licensees, and 
potential infringers—currently have limited options to challenge the validity 
 
 96. Id. at 8. 
 97. Id. at 8–9. 
 98. Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., No. 2018-1559 (Fed. Cir. filed Feb. 18, 2018). 
 99. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2012). 
 100. Rizzolo, supra note 5, at 632–34. 
 101. See, e.g., Univ. of Fla. Res. Found., Inc. v. Medtronic PLC, No. 1:16CV183-MW/GRJ, 2016 
WL 3869877, at *6 (N.D. Fla. July 15, 2016) (holding that the University of Florida Research Foundation 
is an arm of the State of Florida and therefore entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from a 
declaratory judgment suit in federal court).  
 102. See, e.g., id.; Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Res. Found., Inc., IPR2016-01274, Paper 21 at 3 
(P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017) (holding that “UFRF, as an arm of the State of Florida, is entitled to a sovereign 
immunity defense to the institution of an inter partes review”). 
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of state university-owned patents preemptively. Should this continue to be 
the case, state universities may gain added leverage in negotiations with 
licensees, potential licensees, and infringers. Likewise, licensees of state-
owned patents may be free to adopt a more aggressive posture towards 
competitors. However, this safe harbor may be short-lived. 
Recently, the Federal Circuit held that the related doctrine of tribal 
sovereign immunity could not be asserted as a defense to an IPR.103 While 
acknowledging that tribal sovereign immunity differs in certain respects 
from state sovereign immunity, the court suggested that the framework in 
Federal Maritime Commission is illustrative for purposes of assessing tribal 
sovereign immunity.104 Noting distinctions between IPRs and civil suits in 
federal district court, the Federal Circuit determined that IPRs are “agency 
proceedings” that are both “functionally and procedurally different” than 
district court litigation.105 On this basis, the Federal Circuit held that tribal 
sovereign immunity could not be asserted as a defense to an IPR. Saint Regis 
Mohawk Tribe petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari review, but the 
Supreme Court denied the petition.106 
Now that the Supreme Court has let the ruling in Saint Regis stand, the 
Federal Circuit’s analysis of IPR’s under the Federal Maritime Commission 
framework could lead the PTAB to reevaluate its view of state sovereign 
immunity going forward. In addition, assuming the Federal Circuit applies 
the reasoning from Saint Regis to Minnesota’s pending appeal of Ericsson, 
the Federal Circuit appears likely to strike down state sovereign immunity as 
a defense to IPR proceedings later this year. However, practitioners may 





 103. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 104. Id. at 1326. 
 105. Id. at 1329. The Federal Circuit further noted that the Supreme Court has likewise characterized 
as “specialized agency proceedings” as opposed to quasi-judicial proceedings. Id. at 1326 (citing Cuozzo, 
136 S. Ct. at 2143–44). 
 106. Order Denying Certiorari, Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., No. 18-899, 2019 
WL 1590253 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2019). 
